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STATES AND LAWS, JEWS AND PALESTINIANS:
YADGAR'S TRADITIONIST ALTERNATIVE.
A REFLECTION ON YADGAR, ISRAEL 'S JEWISH
IDENTITY CRISIS (Cambridge, 2020)

JAMES J. FRIEDBERG*

In Moby Dick, Herman Melville debates, for pages, whether a
whale is a fish.1 (Not the fastest-moving part of his narrative.) Of
course, a fish has fins and a tail and swims in the sea. It lacks arms and
legs and cannot walk on land. Its body tends to take the form of an
elongated oval-well, fish-shaped. So, Melville concludes that a whale
is probably a fish.2 He got it wrong. He didn't focus on the fact that a
whale nurses its young. Or that it breathed through lungs and had no
gills (or scales for that matter). Or that it was quite smart-a theme
central to the rest of Melville's tale.
But to his credit Melville admitted being not quite sure. He was
writing in the middle of the 1 9 th century, prior to much definitive zoological classification; and while he was a very good writer, he was
not a scientist. Though in his attempt to categorize the whale, he
mused in the best tradition of Aristotle and Talmudists. They sometimes got it wrong, too.
A Jew is like a fish. Or maybe a whale. Hard to define and not
just one thing or the other. Not merely an adherent to a faith. Not
merely a member of a nation. Sometimes both, sometimes one or the
other, but almost always other things as well. A few fish even breathe
through lungs, but because of other things they still are fish.

* Posten Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1975; B.A., Temple University, 1972. The author thanks his research
assistants Isabella Anderson and Samantha Schaal for their research and editing
help. He gratefully acknowledges the support of the WVU College of Law and its
Posten Fund.
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Yaacov Yadgar recognizes that Israel has a whale of a problem.3 What
is a Jew and how can she get along with an Arab? Yadgar writes as
post-secular traditionist epistemologue. 4 He dissents from a Western
way of knowing the world and more particularly with the perspective
of Israel's founding secular Labor Zionists.5 Yadgar proposes that Israel's view of itself is misconceived-that the founding Zionists purported to create a secular liberal, but ethnic (national) state. 6 A Jewish
democracy.7 But, that very concept of Jewish democracy deconstructs
itself. The book aims to fill a "lacuna" in scholarly and political analysis where such analysis has failed to examine the connection between
the claim by founding Zionists to a secular Jewishness and the crucial
and unacknowledged relationship to Palestinians of that claim.s
This essay reviews Israel's Jewish Identity Crisis: State and
Politics in the Middle East, published last year by Yaacov Yadgar
(Stanley Lewis Professor of Israel Studies at the University of Oxford
School of Global and Area Studies). 9 His book connects Israel's sometimes arcane internal identity debates to core issues in the Israel/Palestine conflict, a connection largely unexamined prior to this book.
Yadgar's Argument

Yadgar's argument goes like this: Israel has a Jewish identity
crisis.10 The identity crisis profoundly connects to the conflict with the
Palestinians. The 2018 Basic Law proclaiming "Israel the NationState of the Jewish People" (Nation-State Law) has brought the issue

3 See generally YAACOV YADGAR, ISRAEL'S JEWISH IDENTITY CRISIS (Cambridge

Univ. Press, 2020).
4 The word "epistemology" (the study of how we know the world) and its variants
appear in his text at least 21 times. See id.

' See id.

6 Id. at 20.
7

Id.;

see DECLARATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE OF ISRAEL (May 14, 1948),

https://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Declaration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israel.aspx.
8 YADGAR, supra note 3, at xiii.
9 Id.; see Yaacov Yadgar, U. OXFORD, https://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/academicstaff/yaacov-yadgar.html (last visited June 13, 2021).
10 YADGAR, supra note 3, at xiii.
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of Jewish identity into the spotlight."1 The Nation-State Law explicitly
makes Arabs "the other" in a binary logic of Jew-or-Arab. 12 If Israel
is, indeed, a state of the Jewish people, then Jews would need to maintain a numerical majority to guarantee its continued existence as

such. 13
However, this binary is not new with the 2018 law. Since 1948,
Israeli leaders implicitly followed this demographic logic of Jew-orArab.14 Secular Zionist founders and leaders (the Ben Gurion generation of dominant Labor Zionists) saw Jews as a nation (in the OldWorld sense, like the Serb or Polish or German nation), not as a religion.1 5 So, they were obliged to define Jewishness to determine membership in the nation but could not (recall the Moby Dick dilemma).
They turned to Orthodox rabbis to provide the definition of Jewishness, making these rabbis gatekeepers of nationality. 16 Ironically, and
perhaps cynically, those committedly secular founders turned to religious law to define membership in the secular new state.
The definition of Jew in Orthodox law is a person born to a
Jewish mother or legally converted by a rabbi.1 7 Concurrent with
adopting this definition, the secular Labor Zionist founders ceded to
Orthodox rabbis a monopoly on all religious matters regarding Jews
birth, marriage, divorce, death, Sabbath observance. 18 The deal was
done, Yadgar asserts, primarily to promote the secular founders' racial

" Basic Law: Israel-The Nation State of the Jewish People (5778-2018) (Isr.) [hereinafter Nation-State Law].
12 Yadgar cites Bruno Latour and Zygmunt Bauman in supporting what
will become
a significant critical theme in Yadgar's book, namely, the fallacy of binary classifications-Arab versus Jew, religious versus secular, religion versus nation, etc. Yadgar sees all these as doomed to oversimplify reality, in his view, tradition, dynamic
and complex, better captures what is real. YADGAR, supra note 3, at 56; see NationState Law, supra note 11.
13 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 56.
14

Id at xi-xii.

15 Id at 133-34; see infra note 17.
16 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 41; when I capitalize Orthodox, that refers to the branch
of Judaism. Where orthodox is not capitalized, it is just an adjective.
17 Who is a Jew?, ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 2014), https://www.economist.com/international/2014/01/11/who-is-a-jew [hereinafter Who is a Jew?]
18 Id
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notion of Jewishness, rather than primarily to foster a broader political
base with Orthodox support, as commonly has been argued. 19
Yadgar argues that the presence of half a million Israeli citizens from the former Soviet Union (FSU) spotlights and aggravates
the identity crisis. 20 A "time-bomb," in the words Yadgar adopts from
the Economist.2 1 Such presence challenges the conceptual binary of
Jew-or-Arab (the Russians and their offspring are not Jews by Orthodox law). 22 Furthermore, most non-Jewish Russians find the Orthodox
procedures for conversion too onerous to bother with. 23 If Russian immigrants cannot be counted as Jews, the Jewish numerical majority for
a nation state diminishes-as well as the epistemological stance that,
with statistically minor exceptions, any non-Arab in Israel is a Jew.
The Israeli intellectual left (mostly secular, somewhat atheist)
bemoans its loss of political power. The secularists (mostly, but not
exclusively, leftist or liberal) resent perceived dictates from the Orthodox rabbinate limiting their preferred non-religious lifestyle. The
mostly leftist intellectuals debate, on the Op-Ed pages of Haaretz (Israel's dominant serious left-of-center newspaper), causes and solutions to left-wing loss of power and perceived religious coercion. 2 4
However, Yadgar argues that such dictates were not imposed on liberal society, but were sought by its leaders as part of the decision to
copy the definition of Jewishness from Orthodox law. 2 5
Yadgar suggests that the fundamental problem for Jewish identity and for relations with the Palestinians has been the adoption of the
nation-state as the governing structure for the Jewish homeland, which
to him reflects Eurocentric epistemology-"the Enlightenment Pro-

ject." 26
According to Yadgar, understanding tradition could ameliorate Israel's Jewish identity crisis and the Israel-Palestine Conflict. 27
19 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 41.

20

Id at 54.

21 Id; see Who is a Jew?, supra note 17.

Russian-speaking immigrants to Israel. True Russian nationalists would not consider these folk Russian to the extent that they were Jewish.
22

23 Who is a Jew?, supra note 17.
24 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 4.
25

Id at 2.
Id at 3-4.
27
Id. at 3.
26
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His 2013 essay "Tradition" makes clear that, for him, tradition is not
mere orthodoxy. 2 8 It is history and culture that wisely constrains the
future, but does not fully dictate it. 29 Tradition would undercut the binary of nation-or-religion, enabling a truer picture of Jewishness. Rejection of a nation-state paradigm would soften the binary of Jew or
Arab. Yadgar defers to future events to determine what an Israel-Palestine would look like if the proposed tradition-conscious dialogue
among all stakeholders to take place. He offers tradition as a process
tool, but not as a description of a tangible end. 3 0
Us and Them
Yadgar principally proposes that it has been impossible to define a Jew in secular terms (again remember the fish and the whale,
but with the added complications of race, religion and politics), and,
therefore, the secular Zionist founders of the state made a devil's bargain partly with the Orthodox rabbinate, but mostly with themselves.3 1
Let the rabbis define who is a Jew, and we'll use that. To decide who
is "us" and who is "them." Unfortunately, that deal has satisfied neither the founders' desire for democracy nor for Jewishness. Yadgar
argues that since secular Zionists offer no satisfactory secular definition of Jew, these historically anti-rabbinic Zionists have had to turn
to Orthodox rabbis to be gatekeepers of nationality 32 -a turning point,
which was not a compromise forced on the founding secularists, but
an "out" cynically chosen by them. 33

28

Yaacov Yadgar, Tradition, 36 HUMAN

STUD. 451

(2013) [hereinafter Yadgar, Tra-

dition].
Id at 465-67.
30
Id at 457-62.
29

31 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 40-44.
32 Id at 45; see also Who is a Jew?, supra note 17.
33 Such a compromise included not merely ceding to the rabbis the definition of a

Jew, but also jurisdiction in all things that American jurists would call family law:
marriage, divorce, burial, etc. To the extent that Yadgar is making the broader claim
that the entire compromise was cynical (rather than coalition-building as seems plausible) he may be overdrawing his conclusion. It seems entirely likely that the Labor
Zionists did chiefly desire to bring the Orthodox into their big tent when the new
nation seemed so threatened. See Who is a Jew?, supra note 17.
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Chosen because they could not come up with a secular definition of their own.34 Chosen because the notion of descent-throughblood comported with their notion of nationhood.3 5 Cynically, because
such a choice went against other core aspects of their espoused secular
liberal socialist beliefs. 36 Although perhaps Yadgar ought to be more
forgiving here to leaders of a remnant that had just survived a racist
holocaust3 7 in 1948 they could be excused for thinking that blood
mattered when a few years earlier six million of them had been slaughtered largely on that basis (as scientifically frivolous as Nazi theory
might have been-racists are not always good anthropologists). 3 8 So,
maybe not cynical, maybe just ideologically discordant.
Profoundly, Israel'sJewish Identity Crisis proposes that "who
is a Jew?" is more than mere talmudic navel-gazing for the Jewish
community (however defined) in and out of Israel. 39 The question
both affects and is affected by the Palestine/Israel Conflict. When the
Liberal Zionist founders of Israel created a nation-state for the Jews
just as Germany was founded for the Germans and Italy for the Italians-the liberal Zionist founders locked themselves into an ethnic binary (bind). If we are a democratic state, then the majority must rule.
If we are a Jewish state,40 that majority must be made up ofJews; and,

34 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 45.
3

5

36

Id at 41-44.
Id

Michael Berenbaum, Nazi Anti-Semitism and the Origins of the Holocaust, BRITANNICA (Feb. 9, 2021) https://www.britannica.com/event/Holocaust#ref215485;
31

see also, Locating the Victims, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, (Feb. 9,

2021), https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/locating-the-victims.
38 Furthermore, his revisionist attack on the traditional explanation for Labor Zionists in 1948 ceding jurisdiction over family law to the Orthodox rabbis is not fully
convincing. That explanation-that Ben Gurion and company sought to build a
broader Jewish base in the new state for the struggle against an Arab onslaughtremains convincing notwithstanding his tease "why should the overwhelmingly
dominant laborZionistsfear the dissatisfactionof a then-small minority of orthodox
Israelis?" see YADGAR, supra note 3, at 133-34.
39 See generally YADGAR, supra note 3.

40 Yadgar prefers "State of the Jews," reflecting Israel's ethnic majoritarianism, rather than Jewish values (whatever those might be) as would be implied in the term
"Jewish State." Id at 26.
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for decades after Herzl, in Palestine/Israel that pretty much meant anyone who was not an Arab. 4 1
Yadgar describes at least two problems with this contract of
convenience between the Orthodox rabbinate and secular Zionists who
founded the state. First, it makes the distinction between Jew and Arab
an existential obsession for Israeli Jews, constantly worrying about
being demographically overwhelmed. 42 Second, this rabbinical/secular compact for deciding the us/them question no longer works today. 43 The arrival of a million Russians, 44 mostly since the 1990s, has
rendered the compact problematic. 4 5 Half of them do not meet the rabbinic law definition of a Jew. 4 6 Israel admitted virtually all of them
based on the Law of Return 4 7 whose criteria for immigration to Israel
are much looser than the rabbinate's rules for recognition as a Jew. 4 8
Yadgar echoes an apparently widely read Economist article from

41 Id at 27-28.
42 Id at 54-58.
43 Id at 58-64.
44 That is to say Russian speaking former citizens of the Soviet Union. See id. at 54.
Many Russian nationalists would never consider Jews to be Russian. See Cnaan
Liphshiz, Why Some Jews in Russia Don't Think Putin's Comment About them was
Anti-Semitic,

JEWISH

TELEGRAPHIC

AGENCY

(Mar.

18,

2018),

https://www.jta.org/2018/03/12/global/why-some-j ews-in-russia-dont-think-putinscomment-about-them-was-anti-semitic.
45

YADGAR, supra note 3, at 54; see also Total Immigration to IsraelFrom theformer

Soviet Union, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/totalimmigration-to-israel-from-former-soviet-union (last visited Feb. 6, 2021); On Multiple Fronts, Russian Jews Reshape Israel, NPR
(Jan. 2, 2013),
https://www.npr.org/2013/01/02/168457444/on-multiple-fronts-russian-j ews-reshape-israel; Harriet Sherwood, Israel's Former Soviet Immigrants Transform
Adopted Country, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 17, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/17/israel-soviet-immigrants-transform-country.
46A person born to a Jewish mother or a person converted by a rabbi. See Who is a
Jew?, supra note 17; Rebecca Weiner, Judaism: Who is a Jew, JEWISH VIRTUAL

LIBR.,
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/who-is-a-jew
2021).
4' Law of Return, 5710-1950 (1950) (Isr.).
48 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 56.

(last visited Feb. 9,

8

INTERCULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 16

201449 making the following point. 50 With the immigration of a million Soviets, half of whom are not Jews by strict rabbinic definition,
and who resist onerous orthodox conversion, a demographic timebomb is ticking. 1
One might guess that the author would also describe it as an
epistemological time-bomb as well, since those Russians negate the
binary logic that (for residents of Israel) if you're not a Jew you're an
Arab. Jewish identity in Israel developed as a binary counterpoint to
Arab identity. 52 Lack of Jewish identity in secular Israelis is already
felt by some as an existential threat regarding the arithmetic demographic versus Palestinians.5 3 The definitional limbo of half-a-million
Russian immigrants has heightened that perceived threat.
Statism
Yadgar accurately identifies the founding liberal socialist Zionists (the 1948 leaders) as statists. 54 They believed that Diaspora
Jewish life had degenerated for lack of nationhood and that only by
having a state of their own would Jews again thrive.55 He identifies
both European Enlightenment thought and Westphalian political organization as shaping this early Zionist attitude. 56 He believes that

49 Who is a Jew?, supra note 17.
50 The Economist credits Rabbi Itamar Tubul with first articulating this insight. See
Who is a Jew?, supra note 17.
51 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 36. Tomer Persico disagrees with the Russian-Israeli

time bomb theory. He believed that the non-converted Russian immigrants to Israel
(and their children) have integrated pretty fully into Israeli society, that they identify
with the Israeli nation, that they serve willingly in the armed forces and that they are
for practical purposes part of the Jewish majority. Dr. Persico, an expert in Israeli
political and religious affairs, expressed this opinion in an April 19, 2021 interview
with me in Berkeley where he was a visiting professor at the University of California
and a research scholar for the Hartman Institute.
52 Id
at xiii.
53 Id
54 See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26,
1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (explaining how international law defines a
state as an entity with a fixed territory, a permanent population, a government, and
the ability to conduct foreign affairs with other states).
5 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 100-01.
56
Id. at 172, 189.

2021]

STATES AND LAWS, JEWS AND PALESTINIANS

9

such statism is at the heart of both Israel's identity crisis and the conflict with the Palestinians.7
Because Zionist political leaders insist on a State of the Jews
instead of a Jewish State 58-they have become obsessed with a perceived existential need to maintain a numerical majority over the Arabs, Yadgar observes. 59 Presumably, a Jewish State (one based on
Jewish values rather than on a demographic majority) would not have
a similar numerical imperative. However, while he argues somewhat
convincingly that the State of the Jews will have an ongoing problem
defining who is a Jew (toward counting that majority), 6 0 he ignores the
alternative problem that a Jewish State would have in defining what
are Jewish values. Nor does he indicate how a Jewish Values State
could survive without a numerical majority. Maybe he wants no
state just a Jewish homeland as articulated by the Balfour Declaration, 6 1 coexisting better both with Arabs and with the Diaspora. But
how would Jews fair as a minority in a greater Palestinian territory?
Would the territorial entity be like the European Union? Unlikely. 62
Like Lebanon? Unwelcome. 63
Yadgar does not clarify whether he rejects the possibility of
the state that does not depend on Orthodox law defining who is a Jew
(and therefore part of the Jewish nation), or whether he just thinks that
57
58

Id at xv, 173.
Id at 26 (explaining the title of Theodore Herzl's manifesto for modern Zionism,

Judenstaatcould be translated from the original German as either). My German
speaking friend and colleague, poet and law professor Michael Blumenthal, confirms this translation ambiguity.
59 See The Jewish Mission, HAARETZ (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.haaretz.
com/opinion/editorial/the-j ewish-mission-1.5956180.
60

YADGAR, supra note 3, at 75.

61 See Balfour Declaration, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Balfour-Declaration (last visited Feb. 16, 2021).
62 Given the lack of democratic infrastructure
in the region. See Stephen Farrell,
Explainer-Why can't Israel keep a government together?, REUTERS (Dec. 23. 202),

https ://www.reuters. com/article/us-israel-election-explainer/explainer-why-cant-israel-keep-a-government-together-idUSKBN28X12F; Steve Hendrix, Netanyahu
fails to form a governing coalition by deadline,putting his continued rule into question, WASH. POST (May 4, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/netanyahu-failing-to-form-government/2021/05/04/f255 876a-ac9f-11 eb82c1-896aca955bb9_story.html.
63 Given the horrendous outcomes from attempts by nationalism in Lebanon.
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the state is going about it the wrong way, or whether he does not think
the state should exist (at least as a Jewish State or the State of the
Jews), or perhaps something else.
The Enlightenment Project

Yadgar employs the word "project"in an insinuating manner.
He writes repeatedly of the "Zionist project" and of the "Enlightenment project." His project seems to be to demean the Enlightenment
and Zionism as a somewhat devious phenomena. 64 The Enlightenment
in his view appears as a tool of intellectual oppression against belief
systems of the East. 6 5 Zionism appears as a tool of statist liberals and
socialists seeking to create a monolithic Jewish nationalism. 66 Probably much truth resides in his critique of Zionism and in his critique of
an arrogant Western epistemology. Probably much truth is to be found
in his own intellectual regard for "tradition." However, calling two
significant, probably progressive (for their time) 67 movements "projects" comes off more as slurring than analytical. 68

64 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 172.
65

66

Id at 6-8, 172, 189.
Id at 172.

It is progressive in comparison to the 1500s, 1600s, and 1700s where the Enlightenment's rejection of religious dogma managed by a clerical monopoly was the ultimate arbiter of all truth-spiritual and scientific. Certainly, Zionism's assertion of
a right for self-determination for Jews who have been oppressed in Europe (and to
some significant degree in Muslim lands) for two millennia was progress. The fact
that these or any other movements take on repressive characteristics after initial successes does not defeat their fundamental progressive natures nor render them mere
"projects."
68 The first time I heard the term "project" used in this manner, a smart but annoying
non-Jewish British neo-Marxist friend and colleague employed it at a seminar sometime in the 1980s at West Virginia University-while taking a shot (probably accurately) at some now-unrecalled abuse of capitalism and while attacking liberalism
generally as "the Enlightenment project". Another (Jewish) colleague and I pointed
out to him that most Jews who thought about the matter had a soft spot in their hearts
for the Enlightenment, since it enabled significant emancipation politically and intellectually for many of their ancestors in Europe.
67
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Yadgar rejects a lot-binary logic, secularism, liberalism, the
Enlightenment, the state, and the Peace of Westphalia. 69 One imagines he is heavily affected by his own roots. Coming from an Iranian
Jewish family, he would not be in the ethnic mainstream of the Ashkenazi7 0 intellectual elite in Israel. Like many third-world intellectuals, the domination of Eastern thinking by Western thinking represents
one of the vestiges of European colonialism and an imposed false view
of knowledge. He follows the tradition of Edward Said, whose Orientalism critiqued this phenomenon in a master work half a century
ago. 7 1 Said was probably the most publicly known of the many critical
Of course, he would recognize that the latter set of treaties occurred, but he seemed
displeased with the European system of nation-states it enabled, notwithstanding its
check on Hapsburg imperial autocracy.
70 Most Jews of non-Hispanic European origin. Rabbi Rachel M. Solomin, Who are
Azhekenazi Jews?, MY JEWISH LEARNING, https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/who-are-ashkenazi-jews/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2021). They represented the majority of early Zionists and now comprise a bit more than half of the Israeli population. Broadly speaking, they include large numbers of liberal Zionists and their secular children and grandchildren, many modern Orthodox and traditional Jews, politically conservative Jews from the former Soviet Union, and ultra-orthodox Haredi.
Raysh Wiess, Haredim (Charedim), or Ultra-OrthodoxJews, MY JEWISH LEARNING
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/haredim-charedim/ (last visited Nov. 4,
2021). Yiddish (a medieval German derivative) was the language most brought with
them from Europe. In contrast, the millions of Jews with North African and eastern
Mediterranean background are broadly known as Sephardi, descendants of those exiled by the Spanish expulsion in 1492 and speakers of Ladino (a Spanish dialect).
Rabbi Rachel M. Solomin, Who are Sephardic Jews?, MY JEWISH LEARNING,
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/who-are-sephardic-jews/
(last visited
Nov. 4, 2021). Additionally, hundreds of thousands of Israelis trace their background
to Yemen, Iraq, and Iran (Yadgar among the latter) where Hebreo-Arabic and Hebreo-Persian and other Jewish tongues were spoken to a degree. Together all these
non-European groups are sometimes referred to as Mizrachi, a term which is sometimes controversial. Rabbi Rachel M. Solomin, Who are MizrahiJews?, MY JEWISH
LEARNING, https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/who-are-mizrahi-jews/ (last
visited Nov. 4, 2021). There are two separate chief rabbis in Israel: one for the Ashkenazi and one for the Mizrachi. See Israeli Politics: ChiefRabbis of Israel, JEWISH
VIRTUAL LIBR., https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/chief-rabbis-of-israel (last
visited Nov. 4, 2021); see also ChiefRabbinate, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/chief-rabbinate (last visited Nov. 4, 2021). Both adhere to orthodox
theology and share the legal monopoly on marriage, conversion and other domestic
69

matters. Who is a Jew?, supra note 17; see also YADGAR, supra note 3, at 37-38.
71 See EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978); see Richard Berstein, Edward W. Said,
Literary Critic and Advocate for PalestinianIndependence, Dies at Age 67, N.Y.
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theorists in whose steps Yadgar seems to walk.7 2 To this group of unWestern critics, intellectual domination went hand-in-hand with political domination.
But he reaches too far. The Enlightenment was a good thing. It

diminished the power of absolute despots and of clerical dogma. It
enabled modem science-medicine, increased food production and diminished hunger, global communication, etc. 73 Through the philosophy of Locke, Voltaire and the like, rights to speak, think, worship and
choose government were proclaimed, and gradually-if imperfectly
achieved. Westphalian political reforms of 1648, ushering in the nation-state (codefendant with the Enlightenment in Yadgar's indictment) as the principal form of international organization represented a
significant improvement over the imperialism of Hapsburg, Ottoman,
Moscovite, Mogul, and Ming emperors. To defame the Enlightenment
with the label Project is unfair. To the degree that Europeans in the
modern age colonized, enslaved, slaughtered, and condescended, it
was not because of the Enlightenment, but despite it. If early Enlightenment philosophers occasionally rejected tradition, it was not the dynamic tradition which Yadgar rightfully admires, but the orthodoxy
that forced a confession from Galileo. 74 Tradition might be one word,
but it does not signify only one thing.75 Yadgar could legitimately attack the narrowmindedness of Western intellectuals who have failed
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/26/arts/edward-w-said-

literary-critic-advocate-for-palestinian-independence-dies-67.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm(explaining how, interestingly, Said was a Palestinian-American active in Palestinian causes, including membership in the Palestine national congress).
72 See J. AL-E AHMAD, OCCIDENTOSIS: A PLAGUE FROM THE WEST (1984) (explaining how Said seems to have drawn heavily from Occidentosis, a seminal work by J.
Al-e Ahmad).
73 Id

?4

Id

While much of Yadgar's critique might seem to come from the right-he lauds
tradition, an unjust victim of secular liberalism-there is something of the left in his
attitude, in his tone. He uses she/her as his preferred neutral pronoun. He makes no
comment on this usage-he just does it. Much substance occupies this style. Yadgar
is immersed in how we look at things-epistemology-how we understand the
world. Opting for she/her must be something other than mere political correctness.
He doesn't care about being politically correct, one guesses. He wants to disrupt our
way of knowing things. See YADGAR supra note 3.
71
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to realize the legitimacy of Eastern modes of thought, but he could
have done it without slandering a movement that on the whole, did
much greater good than harm. Edward Said may have spoken important truths, but so did John Locke three centuries earlier.
Law andJews
Law often has dominated Jewish culture. For most of the two
millennia of the Diaspora, leaders of the Jewish people have been lawyers-rabbis who through their intellectual monopoly created and interpreted the rules of Talmud and who governed the community accordingly. 76 Of course, the Talmud itself recorded early (1st to 6 th centuries CE) dialectical interpretation of the laws of the Torah. The rabbis through their Talmudic exegesis had preferential access to the ultimate meaning of the Torah itself. A rabbi's authority as a ruler for
the community was established by his (always his, not her) skill as a
Talmudic lawyer, trained by years of study and debate with rabbis senior to him, and with his peers, and with his students. 77 In 2000 years
of exile in Jewish communities large and small across the globe, rabbis
used the law to maintain their authority and to keep those communities
together. 7 8 Of course, other institutional structures contributed to survival. Traditions, so important to Yadgar, reinforced law and were reinforced by it. The typical household pretty much knew what it was
supposed to do or not do on Sabbath, or on Passover, or upon a birth
or a death or a marriage. 79 Tradition told them, but if they were uncertain about a particular behavior, they could seek a legal opinion from

Occasionally during these two millennia there have been very significant rebellions against Talmudic legalism. The Karaites, probably beginning the eighth century in Persia, broke from mainstream rabbinic Judaism and rejected the Talmud and
its complex compendium of legal interpretation. MARTIN GOODMAN, A HISTORY OF
JUDAISM 301-310 (Princeton Univ. Press 2018). 1000 years later in Europe Hasidism rebelled against the formal legalism of dominant rabbinic practice in favor of a
more spiritual, perhaps mystical approach to Judaism. SAID, supra note 71, at 413425.
77 GOODMAN, supra note 76, at 311.
78 Exilarch, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/exilarch
(last visited Nov 4, 2021).
76

79 Who is a Jew?, supra note 17.
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the rabbi. The word law often may not have been used, but the institution was there in the background.
Well prior to the founding of Israel, millions of Jews left ghetto
culture and thousands became lawyers, not debating Talmud but debating constitutions, statutes, judicial precedent, etc. Jewish cultures
that for centuries had honored lawyer-like dialectic skills would produce attorneys who could exercise such fungible mental prowess in a
secular venue. Secular here, in the context of Europe and North America, has meant something different than secular in Israel. In Israel, as
described by Yadgar, binary logic and practice separates the secular
and religious. 80 That is not necessarily the case in Europe and America. The traditional Jew, one who neither embraces orthodoxy nor
atheism, has dominated American Jewish life for most of the last century. Typically, she either affiliates with the Reform or Conservative
or Reconstructionist branch of the faith, usually celebrates the holidays, perhaps sends her kids to Jewish summer camp and participates
in Jewish culture. Such an American Jewish majority have never had
their lives dictated in any way by Orthodox rabbis and therefore have
seen no need to resent a domination that does exist. Not so in Israel.
That secular law crashes against sacred law in the debate which
Yadgar describes should not surprise us. These are Jews arguing with
Jews about who is a Jew. And about what rights or obligations the
answers to this argument would entail. Cases from the Israel Supreme
Court, statutes from the Knesset, Talmud-guided opinions of Orthodox rabbis all compete here.
In Ka'Adan v. IsraelLandAdministration, the Israeli Supreme

Court clarified the constitutional status of the Basic Law on Human
Dignity and Liberty. 8 1 In its jurisprudence, the court has interpreted
this to mean that the human rights statute trumps contrary ordinary
legislation. 8 2 For example, if a law discriminates against a particular
group, denying them rights enjoyed by another group, that law would
be invalid. Such a conclusion necessarily implies a further principle

80 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 54.

HCJ 6698/95 Ka'adan v. Isr. Land Admin., 54(1) PD 258 (2000) (Isr.).
Basic Laws, Knesset, https://m.knesset.gov.il/en/activity/pages/basiclaws.aspx
(last visited May 13, 2021).
81

82
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related to this constitutionalization of basic human rights law, 83
namely that the court has the power ofjudicial review of ordinary legislation to determine its constitutionality-that is, consistency with the
Basic Law.
Israel has failed to draft a written constitution, notwithstanding
a stated intention to do so at the time of its founding. 84 One might ask
whether such failure reflected the founding Zionists' discomfort at ensconcing rights that could be relied upon by the Arab citizenry of the
new state. In any event, a sequential promulgation over the decades of
various Basic Laws partially have substituted for a full-blown constitution. Basic Laws trump ordinary legislation and are more difficult to
pass or repeal. 85 The Basic Law regarding human rights passed in
1992, and the Basic Law on the Jewish character of the state passed in
2018 raise the most interesting questions and tensions for our analysis
here. 86

83 See Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalizationof the Israeli Legal System as a Re-

sult of The Basic Laws and Its Effect on Proceduraland Substantive CriminalLaw,
31 ISR. L. REV. 3 (1997).
84 DECLARATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE OF ISRAEL (May 14,

1948),

https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Declaration%20of%2O
Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israel.aspx; see also Constitutionfor Israel, KNESSET, https://knesset.gov.il/constitution/Constlntroeng.htm (last visited
Feb. 8, 2021); ANITA SHAPIRA, ISRAEL: A HISTORY 182 (2012).

See Barak, supra note 83. The Knesset does appear to recognize that, regarding
the question of the superiority of the basic laws over other laws, differences of opinion do still exist. Basic Laws, supra note 82. However, the Israeli Supreme Court
has held that ordinary laws are invalid where they contradict a basic law. See e.g.,
HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense, 53(5) (1999) (Isr.) (finding article
237a(a) of the Military Judgement Law, which enabled a military policeman to detain a soldier for four days without first bringing him before a judge, contradicted
the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and was therefore null and void). According to Israeli constitutional law expert and professor, Roy Peled (Berkeley California interview with author April 21, 2021), uncertainty exists regarding the requirements for repeal of a Basic Law, for instance whether a simple or absolute majority is necessary in the Knesset.
86 See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) (Isr.); Basic Law: Israel - the
Nation-State of the Jewish People (2018) (Isr.) [hereinafter Basic Law: Israel as the
Nation-State of the Jewish People].
85
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Yadgar accurately observes that the Jewish Nation-State Law
of 2018 makes Israeli Jews sovereign and Arab Israeli citizens not.87
Under the widely accepted standards of the Reference re Secession of
Quebec ("Quebec Opinion") rendered by the Canadian Supreme Court
in 1998,88 self-determination, entitled by international law to all peoples, may be enjoyed internally within a larger state, but if denied to a
people within that state, then they are entitled to external self-determination. 89 Unlike the Quebecois, which the Canadian court found to
hold equal civic status with their Anglophone sisters and brothers as
well as significant political power and governmental positions within
the Canadian state and its provinces, Arab Israelis possess none of
these, and the Jewish State Basic Law makes that official. 90 Unlike the
official status of the French language within Canada, the Jewish State
Basic Law has officially demoted Arabic to second-class status within
Israel after decades of legal equality. 91 And so on.
A "people" possess the "right to external self-determination ...
where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government
to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development." 92
Under these standards, the Jewish State Basic Law denies Israeli Arabs internal self-determination and thus entitles them to independence

87

YADGAR, supra note 3, at 85-90; see also A State for Some of Its Citizens,

HAARETZ: EDITORIAL, (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/editorial/a-state-for-some-of-its-citizens-1.7004500.
88 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) [hereinafter Quebec
Opinion]; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, T.I.A.S. 92-902; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
89 Quebec Opinion, supra note 88, para. 126-34.
90
Id. para 136, 138.
91 Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People, supra note 86. See also
Moshe Arens, Israel'sJewish Nation-state Bill Is Not Just Useless - It's Harmful,
HAARETZ: OPINION, https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-israel-s-nationstate-bill-is-not-just-useless-its-harmful-1.5471909 (Apr. 24, 2018); Basic Law:
Apartheid
in
Israel,
HAARETZ:
OPINION,
(May
30,
2013),
https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-editorial-don-t-enact-law-against-arabs-1.5271031; Shlomo Avineri, New 'Jewish Identity' Bill Will Cause Chaos in Israel, HAARETZ, (Nov. 21, 2011), https://www.haaretz.com/1.5211668.
92 Quebec Opinion, supra note 88, para. 138.
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from the Israeli state. 9 3 Some Israeli Arabs might want this independence, but many-perhaps most-would not.94 However, the legal
standard articulated by the Quebec Opinion and accepted by International lawyers should shame Israel, particularly if it continues to claim
the mantle of democracy. And it supports Yadgar's observation that
only Jews now officially enjoy sovereignty within the Israeli state of
which both they and Arabs are citizens. 95
Inside Baseball, Inside Haaretz

In the latter part of his book, Yadgar reviews debates within
the left-liberal Israeli intellectual elite regarding national identity and
religious identity. 96 To some extent, this analysis comes across as inside baseball. Only those regularly attending the editorial pages of
Haaretz are likely to recognize the players. 97 He notes this elite's
angst in no longer speaking for a majority of the Israeli public, as well
as the secularists' perception of and resentment of religious coercion. 98
One of the writers Yadgar discusses urges his leftist co-non-religionists to accept their diminution to the rank of one more minority "tribe"
within the Israeli population, albeit a large and sometimes influential
one. 99
Yadgar spends his last two chapters prior to his conclusion,
about 50 pages, mostly on this Haaretz Op-Ed page debate among predominantly left-wing intellectuals concerning whether Israeli entails
93 See Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, supra note 86; see
also Mo she Arens, Israel'sJewish Nation-StateBill Is Not Just Useless - It's Harm-

ful, HAARETZ: OPINION, (Apr. 24, 2018) https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-israel-s-nation-state-bill-is-not-just-useless-its-harmful-1.5471909.
94 This observation is based on my fieldwork in Israel and Palestine while a visiting
scholar at Hebrew University. It is obviously impressionistic. The few Israeli Arabs
with whom I spoke on this issue seemed to express the view (with varied nuances)
that they would prefer to remain citizens of the state now called Israel, but with fully
equal rights. They tended not to want to be citizens of a separate Palestine, if a two
state solution were reached.
95 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 90-97.
96
97

Id at 112-71.
Israel's principal center-left reputable newspaper. See generally HAARETZ,

https://www.haaretz.com (last visited Jun. 12, 2021).
98 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 118-24.
99

Id at 124-27.
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Jewish or not, while noting that such debate often reflects fringe opinions and usually envisions highly unlikely outcomes. 1 00 Two important Israeli Supreme Court cases, Tamrin v. State of Israel and Ornan v. Ministry of the Interior, also figure in this discussion, as they
both reject the notion of an Israeli (as opposed to Jewish or Arab) nationality. 10 1 Yadgar grants that "the elitist discourse reviewed above
is detached from the predominant understanding of Jewishness, Israeliness and Judaism broadcast by the state and practice by its subjects."1 0 2 So, why does he spend over a quarter of his book on it? He
appears to do this as part of his project to demonstrate the fruitlessness
of analyzing Israel's demographic and political problems from a viewpoint that starts with the nation-state as a given. But that point can be
made with less ink, and in fact, he does so elsewhere in the text. 103
One might imagine Yadgar musing, "My God, I read all this stuff. It
must be useful for something."
DemographicShift
Labor Zionist political and philosophical domination has
waned over decades. 104 First, it diminished with the influx of Jews
from North Africa and the Middle East during and after10 5 the 1948
War of Independence, 106 accelerating (particularly from Egypt) with
the 1956 Suez crisis and continuing with the 1967 Six-Day War and
the 1973 Yom Kippur war. During and after each of these conflicts,

100

Id. at 112-71.
CA 630/70 Tamrin v. State of Israel 26(1) IsrSC 197 (1972) (Isr.); CA 8573/08
Oman v. Ministry of the Interior, 66(3) IsrSC 44 (2008) (Isr.)
101

102

YADGAR, supra note 3, at 150.

Id. at 2, 26.
supra note 3, at 126.
105 Thousands of Yemeni Jews have been present in Palestine since
the turn of the
th
century.
See
BAT-ZION
ERAQI
KLORMAN,
TRADITIONAL
SOCIETY
IN TRANSI20
TION: THE YEMENI JEWISH EXPERIENCE 87 (Vol. 39 2014). Iraqi Jews, once a plurality or near plurality in Baghdad, began joining the Yishuv prior to and during World
War II when the Iraqi government grew close to Nazi Germany. Palestine, HISTORY,
https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/palestine (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
106 Known as the "Nakba"to Palestinians, meaning catastrophe. See generally ArabIsraeli
Wars,
BRITANNICA,
(May
18,
2021),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Israeli-wars.
103

104 YADGAR,
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Arab states made it uncomfortable to varying degrees for their centuries-old Jewish populations to remain. Historians can argue whether
the cause of such migration of hundreds of thousands of non-European
Jews resulted from Arab governments forcing them out (as punishment for Israeli victories, or from those governments' truly fearing a
fifth column during wartime) or from the Israeli government convincing these Jews to migrate for their safety and for national fulfillment.
The new arrivals tended to be less liberal and less secular than the
dominant Laborites, who welcomed the demographic addition to the
non-Arab Jewish population, but the newcomers often faced cultural
condescension and material frugality from the secular Ashkenazi Jewish community and the government it dominated. 107 These Mizrachim 108 would form a part of the center-right alliance that took over
the Israeli government in the 1977 elections. 109 Yadgar perhaps might
point out that these North African and West Asian Jews participated
in the disempowering of Labor Zionism more as an expression of cultural tradition than of right wing politics.
Second, within the Ashkenazi (European) population (home to
most secular Zionists), demographic change had begun with the ortho-

107 SHAPIRA, supra note 84, at 242-44, 364-65.
108 Mizrachi and Sephardi are sometimes used more or less as synonyms
for the large
group of Israeli Jews from North Africa, the Middle East, and Balkans. More precisely, Sephardi only refers to those Jews whose ancestors were originally exiled
from Spain after their expulsion in 1492. Iraqis, Iranians, and Yemenis, therefore,
technically would not be Sephardi. Sometimes these immigrants and their descendants are referred to as "traditional" Jews, to distinguish them from Ashkenazi Orthodox. Upon arrival in Israel in the late 1940s and 1950s, they were often housed in
unappealing desert camps or dangerous parts of Jerusalem adjacent to the border
with Jordan. Rabbi Rachel M. Solomin, Sephardic, Ashkenazic, Mizrahi and Ethiopian Jews, MY JEWISH LEARNING, https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/sephardic-ashkenazic-mizrahi-jews-jewish-ethnic-diversity/ (last visited Nov. 2,
2021).
109 About the 1977 Elections, ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INST., https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-

elections-and-parties/elections/1977/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
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dox and ultra-orthodox increasing their percentage in the population."1 0 Such groups tended to be more conservative than the Labor
Zionists.I
Third, the 1973 Yom Kippur War disheartened many followers
of the Labor Party which had been in sole power since the 1948 war
of independence. Although Israel militarily prevailed in the end,1 1 2
Egyptian and Syrian successes in the early days of the conflict gave
the Jewish population a sense of existential anxiety and of anger at the
ill-preparedness of the government and military at the onset of the Syrian and Egyptian offenses.1 1 3 The Labor Party (Mapai) that had ruled
Israel for its first two decades as a state has never recovered.11 4 By
1977, it was ushered out of power with the victory of Menachem Begin
and his Likud Party,11 5 which has dominated Israeli politics since then
with the help of the migration of one million mostly conservative Russians and frequent alliances with ultra-orthodox parties.1 16
In What Sense a "Crisis"?And the Fallacyof Necessity
What does the phrase "identity crisis" mean in this book's title? Is the "crisis" that society has ceded to the rabbinate the power to
decide who will hold full membership in society? If so, that is indeed
a crisis. A democracy should not do that. A country respecting human
rights should not do that. A country with multiple religions and ethnicities should not do that.
Michael Kress, Orthodox Judaism: The State of Orthodox Judaism Today, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-state-of-orthodox-judaism-today (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
1" To some degree, such groups tended to vote as blocs for political parties associated with traditional Sephardi or Ashkenazi.
112
Yom Kippur War, BRITANNICA (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/event/Yom-Kippur-War.
113 Id
114
The Hebrew name of Israel's Labor Party is Mapai. See Mapai PoliticalParty,
JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/mapai-political-party
(last visited Feb. 9 2021); Mapai, ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INST., https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-elections-and-parties/parties/mapai/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2021); see also Israel's
Political Kaleidoscope, ECONOMIST (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/04/09/israels-political-kaleidoscope.
"5
About the 1977 Elections, supra note 109.
116
See Likud, BRITANNICA (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Likud.
11

2021]

STATES AND LAWS, JEWS AND PALESTINIANS

21

However, if the "crisis" is the inability of the state to agree on
a single definition of Jewishness, that's not such a crisis. The fallacy
in such a worry is that purportedly one must come up with a necessary
criterion-for example, birth to a Jewish mother or Orthodox conversion. It is not a big deal that without rabbinical help secular Jews have
not been able to come up with a unique criterion of what makes them
and others Jewish. A laundry list of criteria-no one of which is absolutely necessary-should adequately serve as a reference for defining
Jewishness. The list would include birth-to-mom or conversion by an
Orthodox rabbi, the present rabbi-decreed standards.1 1 7 But it also
might include birth-to-dad, conversion by a Conservative or Reform
or Reconstructionist rabbi, self-identification, service in the IDF, evidence of cultural or social participation in the community, etc. Ticking
off one box might not be sufficient, but ticking off two or three certainly could be. Yadgar does believe that Jewishness is indeed multifaceted. 18 This seems to be part of what is entailed by his view of
tradition. However, he does not seem to recognize that such complex
identity characteristics could form part of a formula for Jewishness
within a nation-state.

Consider the possibility of salutary ambiguity. The kind of
beneficial hedging employed in the Good Friday Agreement for bringing peace to Northern Ireland in 1998.119 That document proclaimed
that the residents of Northern Ireland could consider themselves Irish
or British or both. 120 A brilliant finesse. In a similar spirit, for a different question of identity Israel could accept as Jewish persons that
meets any, or some, of a variety of characteristics: Jewish parentage
maternal or paternal, Jewish practice by rabbinic supervision or by
personal adherence to traditions, self-identification as Jewish, service
in the armed forces etc. Debate could ensue regarding which of these
characteristics would be sufficient to qualify for Jewish nationality on
"?

Who is a Jew?, supra note 17; see also DNA Testing to 'Prove'Jewishness Is

Spine-chilling, HAARETZ: EDITORIAL, (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/
opinion/editorial/dna-testing-to-prove-j ewishness-is-spine-chilling-1.7772897.
118 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 194.

See The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Ir.-N. Ir.-U.K., Apr. 10, 1998, IE GB
980410. Unfortunately, Brexit seems to have roiled this ambiguous but peaceful solution. See James J. Friedberg, Brexit, the MisrepresentationofDemocracy, and the
Rock of Gibraltar,5 U. BOLOGNA L. Rev. 209 (2020).
120 The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, supra note
119.
119
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an Israeli passport, which characteristics would require reinforcing
from other criteria, or which could be defeated by other facts (adherence to another religion). Resolution of such debate is one of the things
that legislatures do. The Knesset could do this, if politics allowed.
The problem of Jewish identity in Israel is not fuzzy-thinking
or cynical liberals not being able to come up with a formula-the problem is wrestling this monopoly away from the Orthodox rabbinate.
Nor should secularists be able to impose the mirror image of the coercion they presently perceive from the Orthodox. That is a political
problem of votes, Knesset seats, and coalitions. It is not solely a problem of somehow-innate philosophical flaws in liberal Zionism or the
nation-state system.
Tradition
Yadgar locates himself as a traditionist "standing outside of the
secular-conservativedichotomy.... This is a loyal yet reflective stance
of the individual and her community vis-a-vis their tradition(s)." 12 1
Some linguistic irony operates here. First the word conservative is
probably not the best choice for the dichotomy he identifies-orthodox would be better, particularly considering that in the Jewish denominational sense the Conservative movement is probably in some
ways close to his idea of traditionist. Second, as mentioned above, he
employs the pronoun her as the default gender to describe male or female-a usage that might be considered non-traditionalby most readers. 12 2 However, it seems consistent with Yadgar's notion of tradition,
as reflecting evolution, not stasis. 12 3 Tradition and convention are not
the same. Convention ("him") may be an element of tradition, but the
historical dynamics of tradition might demand that a convention
changes ("her").
Yadgar recognizes that a binary choice in defining Judaism
doesn't work. Jews are not merely a religion nor merely a nation. They
are people with aspects of both and with multiple other characteristics,
some cultural, some linguistic, some social. Reconstructionism is a
YADGAR, supra note 3, at 190-91 (emphasis added).
accompanying note 75; see also YADGAR, supra note 3, at 10, 11,
15, 28, 43, 47, 49, 52, 53, 57, 191.
123 See generally id. at 189-91.
121

122 See supra text
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fourth branch of western Judaism (situated predominantly in Europe
and the Americas) that captures this phenomenon well. Mordecai
Kaplan founded the movement in America in the mid 2 0 th century,
declaring Judaism neither simply a religion nor simply an ethnic
group, but rather an evolving religious civilization, broad enough to
encompass Heredi, modem Orthodox, Conservative/traditional, Reform Jews, Secular Jews, Zionists, Sephardi, Iraqi Jews, Persian Jews
etc.-a civilization made up of multiple currents flowing within a
larger fluid body. 12 4 It is a bit surprising that Yadgar does not reference
this movement which seems compatible with his traditionist critique.
I am a child of the Enlightenment but also a Jewish traditionist. I feel
no contradiction in appreciating the constrained sovereignty (a word
that for Yadgar seems to have negative connotations) that John Locke
promises me, as well as the roots to my past through an evolving religious civilization.
Palestine
In the very first few paragraphs of his preface, Yadgar proclaims that a major intent of this book is to demonstrate that the purported Jewish identity crisis in Israel is intimately linked to the Israel
Palestine conflict. 12 5 He makes this claim and provides the basic logic
behind it. Namely that Israel's secular Zionist founders and politicians
have based Israel's existence as a state on the maintenance of a numerical Jewish majority. 126 And without that majority the existence of
the state and presumably the Jewish homeland is threatened. 127 However his argument goes, such founders and politicians have been unable to define clearly who is a Jew. 12 8 Leaving hundreds of thousands
of citizens, mostly former Soviets, in limbo and potentially not able to
be counted toward that numerical majority. Furthermore, the whole
idea of a numerical majority is a majority against the Arab minority.
Although this logic seems persuasive on its face, Yadgar doesn't fully
explore its political implications; he spends more time exploring the
124

YADGAR, supra note 3, at 15.
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Id at 14.
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obscure rhetoric and analysis of the secular Jewish intellectuals who
debate Israel's Jewish character or lack thereof. In future work it
would be interesting to hear the author's take on precisely where the
Palestinians fit in his analysis. Within one state? Within two states?
Within a Semitic Union? Within a post statist utopia?
His solution? It's procedural, not substantive. 12 9 He rejects
epistemology that sees the nation state as the only vehicle for a Jewish
homeland. 130 Instead, parties engage in a dialogue that considers a
wealth of sometimes competing Jewish traditions as informing what a
Jewish home in Palestine might look like.13 1 His rejection of the nation-state of the Jews as an epistemological foundation allows us to
leave behind arithmetic regarding Arab as a demographic enemy. 132
However, he does not explain how this might work.
It really does not matter what Livni or Avneri or Avineri or
Fruman conclude (or fail to conclude) in the Op-Ed pages of Haaretz
concerning whether Israeli entails Jewish or not.13 3 What matters is
whether a flexible definition of Jewishness can be created for purposes
of immigration and civic participation and solidarity, in a way that
both facilitates intercommunal acceptance-among the orthodox the
secular and the traditional-within Israel's Jewish population and fair
peace with Palestinian neighbors inside and outside its 1948 borders
(of course, as they say, "appropriately adjusted for some land swaps").
Yadgar doesn't like states. However, a two-state result guaranteeing
both the survival of a tradition-respecting (and pluralist?) Jewish
homeland and of Palestinian sovereignty seems the least troubling of
any practical possible solution.

129 See YADGAR, supra note at 194-95.
130

131

See id. at 3, 6-8.
Id at 191.

132 YADGAR, supra note 3, at 194.

Livni, Avneri, Avineri and Fruman are prominent among the commentators participating in the Israeliness/Jewishness debate in Haaretz. See generally YADGAR,
supra note 3, at 127-47; see also Rami Livni, Three Reasons Israelis Stopped Being
Secular, HARETZ (Jan. 2, 2017); Shlomo Avineri, New 'Jewish Identity' Bill Will
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Conclusion
Yadgar gives us a book that is important, novel, informed and
anti-dogmatic. It links the fascinating question of Jewish identity in
Israel with the crucial question of coexistence with the Palestinians.
While it provides no concrete solution to the Palestine/Israel conflict,
it does suggest a way of thinking that might get us closer to reconciliation. Trust, or more precisely the lack thereof, separates Israelis and
Palestinians. His book attacks binary logic-the kind of attitude that
insists, "you are of me, or you are the other" and "this is mine, so it
can't be yours." It's a step in the right direction, perhaps not sufficient,
but probably necessary.

